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T his article analyses current attempts to interpret the factors 
underlying long-term economic growth, paying special attention to the Latin 
American case. It discusses both the interpretations whose advocates claim 
that geographic conditions have a decisive role in shaping the development 
process and those according to which colonization is seen as giving rise 
to an institutional framework ill-suited for development. The author -based 
on his own estimates- emphasizes the importance of market access and 
the effect of social fragmentation on the establishment of an efficient and 
credible institutional framework. The article concludes with a discussion of 
the impact of inequality on both the quality of institutions and the dynamics 
of growth.
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Economic theory offers a relatively convincing view of 
the immediate factors that promote modern economic 
growth: the accumulation of physical and human capital 
and  technological progress are said to be its main 
explanatory factors. However, these factors by themselves 
can hardly account for the extraordinary inequalities 
observed at the international level or explain the historical 
process of divergence underlying them (Pritchett, 1997). 
The stubborn persistence of underdevelopment defies 
a simple economic interpretation and highlights the 
need for a subsequent analysis in order to identify the 
forces that determine long-term economic growth. The 
purpose of such an exercise would be to explain what 
caused the immediate variables mentioned above to 
evolve so unevenly in different countries and regions. 
This compels us to analyse more fundamental factors 
and longer time spans in order to account for economic 
progress or, in other words, to look to the ultimate causes 
of long-term growth.
In the last few years, various contributions have 
been made in this regard, with economists, political 
scientists, naturalists and historians all weighing in on 
the subject. Their efforts go beyond mere historical 
inquiry, since they seek to identify the key factors that 
explain economic progress in the hope of finding an 
effective solution for underdevelopment. It is a debate 
between history and the present. Unfortunately, the urge 
to find a single, fundamental cause of development has 
led to many synthetic explanations and to overly broad 
interpretations of the secular trend which do not always 
account for the complexity of the dynamics of economic 
and social change which development entails. The purpose 
of this article is not to correct this lack, since such a 
task would lie far beyond this author’s capacities. This 
article simply aims to highlight some of the limitations 
of the dominant interpretations and to mention some 
additional factors that should be borne in mind when 
seeking to explain the development process.
II
Institutions and geography
The recent literature offers two main hypotheses regarding 
the ultimate causes of development. The first stresses the 
decisive importance of geographic factors; it assumes that 
the soil, climate, environment and physical accessibility 
of a region determine the chances of progress (Gallup, 
Sachs and Mellinger, 1998; Sachs, 2001, or Diamond, 
1998). Three variations of this tra c dition focus on 
different, though not incompatible, types of geographic 
influence:  (i) climate, which conditions attitudes regarding 
effort and has an effect on people’s productivity; (ii) 
geography, which determines technological options, 
land productivity and conditions in terms of mobility 
and transportation; and (iii) the persistence of certain 
diseases influenced by the bio-physical conditions of 
the environment.
According to all of these theories, the factors that 
determine the possibilities of development are beyond 
human control, or at least relatively so. There are various 
sorts of evidence that support this theory; the most cogent 
ones, however, refer to the difficulties that tropical or 
landlocked countries without navigable rivers have been 
implementing a successful development strategy. The 
costs of certain epidemic diseases and their prevalence 
in specific areas – which happen to be in the tropics 
– lend added weight to this approach by underscoring 
the difficulties that certain environmental conditions 
pose for life in general and for production activities in 
particular.
Notwithstanding the recognized importance of 
geographic aspects, the proponents of this thesis do 
not seem to have proven that the natural environment 
is the ultimate cause of economic backwardness. The 
relatively unchanging nature of geographic conditions 
makes them unlikely to explain the sudden economic 
shifts experienced by many countries at specific points 
in time (present-day China comes to mind). Nor can 
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it explain the contrasting economic performance of 
neighbouring countries that share a similar geographic 
environment (Mexico and the United States, for example, 
or the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and the 
Republic of Korea).
The strongest argument against this approach, 
however, lies in the regression suffered by certain societies 
that used to play a distinguished role in their region 
but which now lag behind their neighbours. This is the 
“reversal of fortune” to which the specialized literature 
refers. The clearest examples of this phenomenon are 
the Inca, Aztec or Mogol civilizations, which were noted 
for their complexity and wealth circa 1500, and are now 
part of the developing world. Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson (2002) have attempted to show that these 
reversals of fortune are more than a string of isolated 
cases. Using urbanization as an indicator of prosperity 
for a sample group of developing countries, they have 
found a negative correlation between the percentage 
of the population living in urban areas five centuries 
ago and current gross domestic product (GDP). This 
finding evidences the differences existing between 
shifts in the relative position of these countries and 
their more permanent geographic conditions. However, 
the questionable quality of the data employed and the 
ratio’s high levels of dispersion cast doubt on the value 
of this exercise.
It should be noted that these critiques, although 
well founded, do not mean that environmental conditions 
cannot influence development processes. First of all, 
geographic conditions may not be as static as they appear; 
changing natural or environmental conditions may have 
contributed to the reversals mentioned above. Changes in 
climate caused by severe droughts or the degradation of 
fragile ecosystems, along with escalating clashes between 
groups over the control of  resources, appear to have been 
behind the collapse of relatively advanced societies such 
as those of the Huari, Tiahuanaco, Calakmul or Cahokia 
peoples (Diamond, 2005, or Mann, 2006). Furthermore, 
it is possible that certain environmental characteristics 
may be of little significance in some contexts but may 
matter a great deal in others. For example, the location of 
certain Latin American capitals in the interior may have 
had little relevance at the time of their founding, when 
exchanges were few and defensive considerations were 
given top priority, but it may have become a hindrance to 
communication and transportation once their economies 
joined the world market. In this regard, the orientation 
of Latin America along a primarily vertical axis, the 
presence of mountain ranges which fragment the region 
and the absence of significant navigable rivers must have 
been a major obstacle to the movement of people, crops, 
ideas and goods.1 Of course, the fact that geographic 
factors are important does not necessarily mean they 
are the cause of economic backwardness.
Hence the idea that institutions (not geography) 
determine development. By “institutions”, we mean 
a system of incentives (and penalties) that stem from 
society and that structure the interaction between agents, 
thus conditioning collective behaviour. Institutions help 
set expectations regarding the behaviour of the group, 
reducing society’s uncertainties and transaction costs. 
In generic terms, institutions help to establish incentives 
for investment in physical and human capital and thus 
determine the chances of aggregate growth (North, 
1993).
The proponents of this idea suggest that the 
institutional framework of developing countries was 
determined by the type of colonization they experienced. 
The settlement and farming patterns adopted by colonists 
in conquered lands shaped the institutions they created. 
Thus, underdevelopment is not a result of factors which, 
like geography, are beyond human control, but rather of 
phenomena – such as institutions – which are genuine 
social creations, albeit ones which date back to the 
country’s forced insertion into the global economy.
Variations can also be found within this tradition. On 
the one hand, Acemoglu and Johnson (2003) or Acemoglu, 
Johnson and Robinson (2001, 2002 and 2006) argue 
that colonial settlement patterns can explain the type of 
institutions – private-property-based or extractive – that 
were established in conquered lands. In areas where 
the unhealthy conditions of the environment prevented 
Europeans from establishing settlements, where there 
were large populations that could be directly exploited, 
forced into servitude or otherwise coerced, or where little 
extractable wealth existed, Europeans made little effort 
to develop systems for increasing aggregate welfare by 
establishing primarily extractive institutions. In contrast, 
in places where colonization was based on the occupation 
of virgin lands and the exploitation of their resources, the 
colonists themselves tried to develop institutions – partly 
imported from their native countries – which protected 
private property, encouraged free markets and spurred 
growth. While environmental conditions – particularly 
endemic diseases – may also have influenced development, 
they did not do so directly, but rather through the 
colonization model they fostered. In areas with a high rate 
1 For a weighted analysis of the impact of various geographic factors on 
Latin American development, see Gallup, Gaviria and Lora (2003).
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of deadly disease, Europeans avoided building settlements, 
choosing instead to establish extractive institutions that 
ultimately hindered development.
This same hypothesis has been used to explain 
reversals of fortune. The most populated and developed 
areas – that is, the wealthiest ones at the time of 
colonization – saw the establishment of extractive 
institutions that would later hamper their development. 
Conversely, in the least populated areas (originally the 
poorest ones), a settlement pattern predominated that 
would eventually lead to the creation of the type of 
market institutions that would ultimately drive their 
development. Thus, the reversal of fortune is actually a 
“reversal of institutions”.
Another variation on this approach has been 
suggested by Engerman and Sokoloff (1997, 2002, 2005 
and 2006), who argue that initial factor endowments 
not only determine the distribution of income, but also 
give shape to institutions that match those patterns 
(Engerman, Haber and Sokoloff, 2000; Sokoloff and 
Engerman, 2000). Income distribution patterns were 
highly unequal in areas suited for large-scale agriculture 
which enjoyed substantial economies of scale and had 
access to slave labour (Brazil or the Caribbean, for 
example), or in places where large indigenous populations 
could be exploited and forced into labour (Mexico or 
the Andean region). These environments generated 
exclusionary institutions that served a small elite and 
that had a limited capacity to generate effective results. 
Conversely, places with a small indigenous population 
and an environment better suited to family agriculture 
(certain parts of the east coast of the United States, for 
example) generated more democratic institutions which 
focused on providing public goods, protecting property 
rights and encouraging economic opportunities. Thus, 
initial factor endowments influence the level of social 
inequality and the resulting institutions; the institutions, 
in turn, affect the chances of growth.
Consequently, whether because of the nature 
of settlement patterns or as a result of initial factor 
endowments, institutions determine the development 
path. Institutions are shaped by distribution patterns 
and vice-versa. To the extent that Latin America is a 
reference point for these studies (particularly those of 
Engerman and Sokoloff), the hypothesis they suggest 
is a good starting point for the analysis of the region’s 
development agenda. Before reaching any conclusions, 
however, their arguments must be examined.
III
History without “historic data”
The institutional explanation of development has found 
considerable support within academic circles and 
international organizations. Among the latter, it has 
become the dominant interpretation of the relationship 
among poverty, institutions and development, creating 
what appears to be a “new orthodoxy” on the subject 
(Dobado, 2007). Echoes of this view can be found in 
two World Bank studies on the relationship between 
inequality and development in Latin America:  “Inequality 
in Latin America:  Breaking with History?” (De Ferranti, 
Perry and others, 2004) and “Poverty Reduction and 
Growth:  Virtuous and Vicious Circles” (Perry, Arias and 
others, 2006). It is also the basic premise of the “World 
Development Report 2006:  Equity and Development” 
(World Bank, 2005).
There are several possible explanations for the 
strong support received by the institutional hypothesis. 
First of all, it is consistent with the basic principles 
of liberal Anglo-Saxon philosophy – Locke, Smith or 
Stuart Mill – that informs a great part of economic 
doctrine and highlights the role that the liberal order 
and property rights play in laying the foundations 
of progress. Second, it relies neither on geographic 
determinism – which focuses on factors that are beyond 
human control (as Diamond, 2005, might suggest) 
– nor on Weberian culturalist approaches, which draw 
a distinction between good colonists and bad colonists 
(see Landes, 1998). Contrary to both positions, the 
institutional approach attributes underdevelopment to 
the social framework that shapes human conduct (in 
other words, to institutions) in an attempt to explain 
the phenomenon in endogenous terms. This effort to 
internalize institutions by means of these rather clever 
procedures is one of the unquestionable merits of these 
proposals. Finally, this vision is consistent with the 
messages that international organizations are attempting 
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to promote regarding the role of institutional quality and 
social cohesion in national development strategies.
Are these hypotheses solidly supported by historical 
evidence? Not entirely. The historical data they cite do 
not fully support their claims. The evidence provided by 
Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (hereinafter referred to 
as AJR) and Engerman and Sokoloff (hereinafter referred 
to as ES) consists of so-called “natural experiments” 
arising from various colonization experiences. According 
to Engerman and Sokoloff (2006, p. 38), “the history 
of European colonization provides scholars with a rich 
supply of evidence, a research laboratory, that can be 
used to study economic performance and the evolution 
of institutions over the long run.” The available data, 
however, do not justify the generalizations they sometimes 
make, and their information is, at times, debatable.
The critics may base their arguments on the works 
of the economic historians themselves (particularly Latin 
Americanists), whose analyses and evidence that have 
little in common with the conclusions reached by AJR 
and ES. The following subsections cover the four main 
objections which can be raised in this regard. 
1. Too many generalizations
First of all, the approaches of ES and AJR entail too 
many generalizations. This criticism can be divided into 
two complementary arguments: on the one hand, a single 
factor can hardly explain the many different situations in 
which developing countries currently find themselves; on 
the other, even the historical factors mentioned by these 
authors to illustrate their hypotheses are not applicable 
to all the countries considered.
With regard to the first point, the relevant question 
would be whether the disparate development paths 
followed by different countries can be explained by a 
vague and general description of colonization patterns. 
Is the dichotomy between extractive institutions and 
private property enough to explain the diversity of 
situations found in the developing world? Latin America 
is a good example, since few colonial systems generated 
an institutional framework as unified and homogeneous 
as the Spanish one (Elliott, 2006). How could a common 
institutional framework produce such diverse results in 
terms of development? As Coatsworth (2007) points 
out, in 1800 the differences in productivity between 
the richest and poorest Latin American colonies were 
almost as great as the differences between the richest 
and poorest regions of the world as a whole.
As for the second point, it is highly unlikely that 
the guidelines used to identify colonization models can 
be applied across the board to every country studied. For 
example, it is doubtful whether an extractive colonization 
model can be attributed to all of Latin America, or that 
a market-based system can be attributed to all of the 
eastern United States (as AJR argues). In the first case, 
there are exceptions, at least in the Southern Cone of 
Latin America; in the second, there are also exceptions, in 
the states of Virginia and the Carolinas. Why didn’t this 
discrepancy result in clearly differentiated development 
paths? Moreover, the Southern Cone colonization model, 
which is more similar to that of the east coast of the 
United States, should have given rise (according to ES) 
to democratic, inclusive institutions; inequality levels 
in Chile, however, are among the highest in the region, 
and those of Argentina and Uruguay, although lower, 
are equally high in global terms.
Even the countries that had quite similar patterns of 
colonial exploitation followed very different development 
paths, contrary to what AJR and ES suggest. This was the 
case, for example, of Cuba and Brazil, where a similar 
colonization model of plantations and slave labour was 
applied. Nevertheless, while one of these countries – Cuba 
– became one of the richest societies in Latin America 
in the early nineteenth century, the other one – Brazil 
– became one of the poorest. Another clear example 
is that of Central America, where countries such as 
Guatemala or Nicaragua have low income levels and 
high degrees of inequality and yet were not colonized 
under the plantation-slave or forced-mining models 
typical of extractive institutions.
2.  Lack of historical data
Another characteristic of the institutionalist interpretation 
is its use of history to explain the ultimate causes of 
underdevelopment. Its references to history are broad and 
lacking in details about actual “historical facts”; in their 
interpretations, AJR and ES include very few historical 
data, sequence analyses or detailed contextual studies. 
Instead, they offer broad interpretations of “metahistorical 
narratives” (Coatsworth, 2007, p. 2) that are constructed 
on a very limited empirical basis which, in the best of 
cases, suggests rather than demonstrates the hypotheses 
they are trying to defend. As noted by Dobado (2007), 
the economic history of Latin America or other former 
colonies is rarely mentioned in the writings of Engerman-
Sokoloff or in those of Acemoglu-Johnson-Robinson. 
A quick glance at the bibliographies of their works is 
enough to corroborate this fact.
This lack of historical data would matter less if 
the analyses offered by AJR and ES were supported by 
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evidence and findings from historical studies of the region. 
But that does not always seem to be the case. Firstly, as 
noted earlier, they seem to have made very little use of the 
research carried out by specialists in economic history, 
and they have not compensated for that shortcoming by 
providing their own reconstruction of history. But they 
also take for granted the existence of a reality which, in 
many cases, has been challenged by historical studies. 
This issue will be taken up later in this article; for now, 
suffice it to say that AJR speaks of the existence of a 
large indigenous population as a factor leading to the 
establishment of an extractive colonization model in 
Mexico or in the Andean region. Can this argument be 
maintained without modifications, when we know full 
well that 90% of the local population disappeared within 
just one century? Did not the demographic catastrophe 
that followed the arrival of the first Europeans have some 
impact on the type of institutions that arose during the 
colonial period? (Dobado, 2007).
3. Excessive confidence in historical inertia
One of the positive contributions of the institutional 
approach is that it has brought back the temporal sequence, 
or historic inertia. As noted by Banerjee and Iyer (2002, 
p. 2), “in the new institutionalist view, history matters 
because history shapes institutions and institutions shape 
the economy.”
Indeed, many of the obstacles to development 
are hard to understand without referring back to the 
historical processes from which they originated. It would 
be going too far, however, to say that the explanation 
for backwardness necessarily lies in the colonial era. 
Przeworski and Curvale (2005, p. 2) are right when 
they argue that “institutionalism is a mirror image of the 
dependency theory”; though in this case the institutions, 
shaped in their time by the colonial powers, are acting 
as determinants of development.
In regions such as Latin America, this means looking 
500 years in the past to explain the shortcomings of the 
present. Has nothing important happened since then? 
That would be surprising, given that, in the interim, 
many historically significant events have occurred in the 
region, including (i) independence, which represented a 
crucial break in the patterns of international insertion, 
the structure and dynamics of society and the make-up 
of institutions in these countries; (ii) the transportation 
revolution of the mid-nineteenth century, which reduced 
potential agglomeration economies at a time when Latin 
America had not yet begun to industrialize; (iii) the rise 
in prices of raw materials during the intercentury period, 
which accentuated the primary-export specialization of 
the region; (iv) the State-led industrialization policies 
of the second half of the twentieth century, which 
helped enhance manufacturing capabilities, but also 
led to significant imbalances in the management of 
national economies; and finally, (v) the debt crisis and 
the economic reforms of the 1980s, which influenced 
changes in the orientation of economic policy. These are 
all important events in the economic history of the region, 
but they are not even considered by the proponents of 
the institutional thesis.
4. Questionable interpretation
Disregard for historical research and a penchant for 
generalizations lead AJR and ES to interpretations of 
historical data that are not borne out by the findings of 
specialized studies. While there is no space here for an 
exhaustive list of their inconsistencies, some representative 
examples are listed below:
(i) It is not clear that the backwardness of Latin America 
originated during the time period mentioned by 
AJR and ES. Coatsworth (2005, p. 8) dates it much 
later, around the time of independence. He points 
out that Latin America was not underdeveloped 
by any conventional standard (such as per capita 
GDP) until some time between 1750 and 1850. 
Haber (1997) also traces the backwardness of the 
region to that period (nineteenth century), as does 
Bulmer-Thomas (1994). Prados de la Escosura (2005) 
compares the region not with the United States but 
with the rest of the members of the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), and moves the date forward by almost 
a century: “Latin America’s retardation, vis-à-vis 
OECD countries, appears to be a late twentieth 
century phenomenon.”
(ii) Their emphasis on the encomienda as an example 
of an extractive institution established in Latin 
America appears to contradict the proven decline 
of that institution from the seventeenth century 
onward (Carmagnani, 2004). And neither can the 
hacienda model be generalized as the predominant 
form of agrarian exploitation in Latin America 
(Miño, 1991).
(iii) Contrary to the assertions of ES, forced labour in 
the mines does not appear to have been a standard 
recruitment procedure, except maybe during the 
early stages of colonization (Velasco, Flores and 
others, 1989). In fact, data on Mexico suggest that 
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miners’ wages were relatively high, thus refuting 
the idea that working conditions and wages were 
little short of slavery (Dobado, 2007).
(iv) The Spanish colonizers do not appear to have 
neglected the regulation of property rights, and there 
is no evidence of legal restrictions that would have 
prevented the indigenous population from owning 
land or mines (Dobado, 2007).
(v) The picture that Engerman and Sokoloff paint of a 
highly polarized colonial society, while accurate to 
some extent, does not take into account the existence 
of a middle – and mestizo – class that in some cases 
was quite substantial (Carmagnani, 2004). The 
available data seem to suggest that the comparatively 
high levels of inequality in Latin America are more 
a product of the post-nineteenth-century period 
than the immediate consequence of colonization 
(Coatsworth, 2005; Williamson, 1999).
(vi) Finally, a comparative study of the evolution of 
institutional frameworks in Spain and Latin America 
suggests that there are similarities that cannot be 
attributed either to factor endowments or to income-
distribution patterns, thus refuting the arguments 
of ES (Coatsworth and Tortella, 2002).
Of the points mentioned above, it seems particularly 
relevant that there is no evidence of anomalous inequality 
levels in Latin America in the period immediately after 
colonization, since this is one of the basic assumptions put 
forward by ES (who do not, in fact, provide any evidence 
for it). The data seem to suggest that, although inequality 
in Hispanic America was high, it did not exceed that of 
other regions which did have a successful industrialization 
experience (Coatsworth, 2005). For example, according 
to Gourguignon and Morrison (2002), in 1820 the level 
of inequality in Mexico was similar to that of the United 
Kingdom; Williamson (1999), using a wage-rent ratio 
of land, confirms that the sharpest increase in inequality 
occurred during the decades preceding the First World 
War; Gelman (2007) suggests that, to a large extent, the 
current inequality in Argentina can be traced to the last 
third of the nineteenth century; and that finding seems 
to apply to Uruguay as well, according to the studies of 
Bértola Flores (2005).
As it happens, these studies refer not only to 
income distribution, but also to the most important 
asset of the time: land. Coatsworth (2005, p. 139), for 
example, points out that land ownership (and wealth in 
general) was no more concentrated in Latin America 
than it was in the thirteen British colonies (or in 
industrialized Great Britain itself). This underpins his 
conclusion that “the thesis put forward by Engerman 
and Sokoloff, while plausible, is almost certainly 
mistaken”.
to be defined as extractive or market-oriented? No clear 
answer is provided to that question.
Despite their silence on the subject, it is possible 
to infer some of the questionable doctrinal assumptions 
that underpin – sometimes implicitly – the positions of 
AJR and ES. Specifically, their main assumptions are 
as follows: (i) institutions are the formal framework 
that establishes the set of restrictions within which 
agents operate; (ii) it is possible to establish, a priori, a 
universally valid optimal (or at least adequate) framework 
of institutions that will promote development (the so-called 
“market institutions” which the authors never define) 
and (iii) this framework consists mainly of institutions 
devoted to protecting property rights and guaranteeing 
IV
Which institutions?
If the proponents of the institutional hypothesis invoke 
history without studying it, the objection could also be 
raised that they stress the importance of institutions 
without offering a clear definition of what is understood 
by “institution”, or what steps could be taken to create 
the institutional framework needed to foster development. 
This is no small matter, given the intense debate that 
surrounds the issue.
Indeed, neither AJR nor ES make any effort to 
analyse or explain the concept of institutions used in 
their arguments. The references AJR make to the two 
types of institutions – extractive and market-oriented 
– on which their hypothesis is based are generic and 
vague. What features should institutions have in order 
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democratic forms of government (as well as institutions 
that provide public goods – particularly the training of 
human resources).
This is clearly a limited understanding of what 
constitutes an institutional framework. AJR and ES fail 
to consider two particular issues that are essential when 
interpreting the development process: the importance of 
informal institutions and the predominantly contingent 
nature of the institutional framework. These may be 
summarized as follows.
1. Formal and informal institutions
The first problem is the failure of AJR and ES to consider 
the role of informal institutions – that is, institutions 
that cannot be specifically defined, and are based less 
on laws or rules than on beliefs, traditions and cultures 
– in economic and social life. There are two different 
types of institutions:  formal ones that are open to public 
scrutiny and provide a framework of incentives (and 
penalties) that are recognizable by society, and informal 
ones that are more difficult to identify, partly because the 
incentives (and penalties) they offer are less explicit, and 
partly because they sometimes represent highly specific 
responses to the circumstances of a given social group 
(not of society as a whole). While formal institutions 
are based on impersonal relations and usually create 
universal (or multilateral) frameworks of agreement, 
informal institutions tend to be more interpersonal, tacit 
and custom-based. As societies modernize and the market 
becomes a more dominant force, informal institutions 
tend to give way to institutions of an explicit, formal 
nature. Thus, for example, traditional forms of land 
ownership, deeply rooted in the local memory, give way 
to official property registry systems, and communal forms 
of labour based on agreement or custom are replaced 
by explicit labour contracts. Informal institutions figure 
more prominently in traditional economies and societies 
that are more fractionalized.
Indeed, in a fairly non-mercantile economy (for 
example, in poorer countries, or in the agricultural 
sectors of such countries), informal institutions may 
be relatively efficient, since they are based on custom 
and on familiarity and trust between agents. They 
reduce transaction costs considerably although they do 
so at the expense of market expansion and productive 
specialization. As the circle of relations among agents 
expands, the potential for opportunistic behaviour 
increases. Consequently, transaction costs rise, and 
formal, multilateral rules of an impersonal nature become 
necessary (Bardhan, 2005). This process was studied by 
Greif (1994 and 2004) in connection with contractual 
guarantees for long-distance trade between Genoa and 
North Africa during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries 
(Greif, Milgrom and Weingast, 1994).
The importance of institutions lies not only in their 
ability to reduce transaction costs, but also in their ability 
to foster social change and adapt to the new needs of a 
changing world. In this regard, formal institutions offer 
more advantages than informal ones. While formal 
institutions are more transparent and open to criticism, 
informal institutions are more opaque and bound by 
inertia; being narrow in scope, they also hinder social 
mobility. North (2005, p. 157) points out that, whereas 
formal institutions can be changed by a decision, informal 
institutions are not easily influenced by a deliberate 
short-term change, and their enforcement features are 
only imperfectly subject to deliberate control.
In short, the increasing mercantilization of societies 
– their development process – appears to go hand-in-
hand with the gradual disappearance of informal (and 
communal) institutions, and their replacement by more 
formal (and universal) mechanisms. This process creates 
more opportunities for social change, improving the 
“adaptive efficiency” of institutions. As North (2005) 
points out, obtaining an efficient institutional response 
at a given moment is not as important as ensuring that 
the institutional framework will be able to adapt to 
changing economic circumstances. From this standpoint, 
the gradual formalization of the institutional framework 
is not only a product of development, but also a factor 
that can help encourage it. Conversely, the prevalence 
of informal institutions may be an obstacle to change. 
Informal institutions may, in fact, be used by certain 
groups as a mechanism for resisting a system they 
perceive as foreign. This explains why informality is 
predominant in highly fractionalized societies. Latin 
America is one example of this phenomenon (Perry, 
Maloney and others, 2007).
The effectiveness of formal institutions may be 
undermined by the continued presence, underground, of 
informal institutions with high enforcement capacities. 
As is well known, institutions exist if they are able to 
shape social behaviour, generating predictable behaviour 
in individuals (North, 1990). In order to generate regular 
behaviour, however, an institution must be conceived as 
a system that encourages individuals to identify with the 
behaviours that are expected in light of the framework 
of incentives established by the system, thus giving 
rise to an endogenous or self-sustaining structure. In 
other words, a norm that is not followed (and that no 
one expects others to follow) does not constitute an 
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institution, regardless of whether it is embodied in 
a law or an organization. Consequently, it is just as 
important to analyse existing rules as it is to study the 
reasons individuals have for following them. It may be 
that, when an attempt is made to superimpose a formal 
institutional structure on a previously existing (informal) 
one, the resulting structure will be inefficient, as it will 
be unable to effectively mould social behaviour. This 
explains the limited success of “institutional transplant” 
formulas intended to replicate in a developing country 
Source: Prepared by the author, on the basis of data from the World Bank (2006) and Alesina, Devleeschauwer and others (2003).
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an institutional response that is supposedly efficient in 
a developed country. Such impositions may actually 
revitalize informal institutions, turning them into 
strongholds for groups that feel threatened by the new 
institutional framework, thereby hindering processes of 
mobility and social change.
Given all of the above, an alternative explanation 
might be found to the one suggested by AJR and ES. It may 
FIGURE 2
Ethnic and linguistic fractionalization and institutional quality 
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be that, in countries where “land colonization” (settlement 
of virgin lands) was practised, formal institutions (partly 
imported from Europe) took hold, and, as a result, these 
countries were better prepared for mobility and social 
change, driven by changing market incentives. On the 
other hand, in countries where “people colonization” 
(with large indigenous groups) was practised, formal 
institutions overlapped (and sometimes clashed) with 
previously existing informal institutions, fostering social 
fractionalization and hindering the mobility and social 
change required by the market. According to this view, 
economic backwardness may have been caused less 
by colonial institutions themselves than by informal 
institutions’ resistance to change, in a setting of social 
disarticulation brought about by colonization itself.
It is not easy to gather information on the fabric 
of informal institutions, and even less so when those 
institutions are part of the historical past. Social 
fractionalization (ethnic or linguistic) may be a good 
yardstick for measuring this phenomenon. The durability 
of ethnic and linguistic fractionalization can be used to 
create variables that express the prevalence of informal 
institutions. There is clearly a negative correlation between 
the degree of linguistic and ethnic fractionalization (see 
Alesina, Devleeschauwer and others, 2003) and the level 
of development measured in terms of 2004 per capita 
GDP, at purchasing power parity (figure 1).
As mentioned above, formal institutions are likely 
to be less effective in social contexts where informality 
is high (estimated in terms of social fractionalization). 
As shown in figure 2, although the linkage is not as 
clear, there is also a negative correlation between ethnic 
and linguistic fractionalization and institutional quality 
(measured by the rule-of-law indicator). 2 
2. Do optimal institutions exist?
The second problem with the interpretation offered by 
AJR and ES lies in the questionable assumption that it is 
possible to define what constitutes an optimal institutional 
framework without taking into account the social context 
of each country. The existence of multiple equilibria, 
the complementarity of institutions and the fact that the 
same institution might serve different purposes make it 
difficult to define a universal and optimal institutional 
response to any given problem. Moreover, even if there 
were consensus regarding an economic policy, there could 
2  This indicator appears in a World Bank publication, and was deve-
loped by Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005).
be a wide range of institutional options for achieving 
that policy objective. This does not mean that any 
institutional response is valid, or that alternative options 
should not be considered, but rather that there are many 
possible responses – all of them equally acceptable – in 
a given context. This underscores the importance of 
taking local conditions into account when determining 
whether or not an institution is appropriate (Islam and 
Montenegro, 2002).
The relative specificity of institutions explains the 
relative effectiveness of so-called transitional institutions 
(Quian, 2003):  mechanisms designed to adjust the existing 
institutional framework to changes in circumstances. These 
institutions are not designed to meet the rigid standards 
of supposedly optimal institutions, but rather allow for 
the correction of inefficiencies through a dynamic, highly 
specific process. From an abstract perspective, these 
institutions could probably be considered inefficient. 
They make transition possible, however, by adjusting to 
local conditions and fostering changes that are consistent 
with a country’s development objectives. In this regard, 
the principle of “remediability” of institutional change 
cited by Williamson (1985) is worth remembering: an 
institution should not be considered inefficient unless a 
better, socially viable alternative exists. In other words, 
the efficiency of an institution should not be judged in 
terms of a supposedly universal design, but rather in light 
of the best options that are socially feasible.
For example, no one would point to China as an 
example of a market economy where property rights are 
protected (the two aspects of an institutional framework 
most valued by AJR); China, however, has been growing 
at average rates of nearly seven percent of per capita 
GDP for more than ten years. What is happening? Is 
it a successful economy trapped inside an inefficient 
institutional framework? A more likely explanation is 
that the country is generating highly specific institutional 
responses, which might be considered inefficient by the 
standards of an ideal market economy, but are highly 
conducive to change in the specific context of Chinese 
society. In this regard, the country’s institutions satisfy 
the criterion of adaptive efficiency mentioned above.
In short, while the formal institutions established 
in the Hispanic New World may have been inefficient, 
one cannot assume that this was because they fell short 
of an optimal universal model; any conclusion regarding 
inefficiency should be based on the study of the specific 
social conditions of the societies involved. It does not 
seem unreasonable, therefore, to take a closer look 
at history, to try to determine the appropriateness of 
institutions and their inertia over time.
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V
Empirical evidence of the importance 
of institutions






where P represents the 1890 population, i and j the urban 
nuclei considered and L the distance between the two.
This formula was applied to both domestic and 
international markets, although with different criteria. 
Specifically, in the case of domestic markets, all cities 
with a population of over 30,000 in 1870 were analysed, 
and the distance used was that between each urban 
nucleus and the capital of the country. Thus, the more 
urbanized a country is, and the shorter the distances 
between its urban nuclei, the larger the actual size of 
its domestic market will be. The size of international 
markets was measured using only the populations of the 
capitals of countries located within a maximum radius 
of 3,000 kilometres, which is a reasonable way to define 
a relatively proximate regional market. 
The trade integration variable is determined by three 
factors:  firstly, in negative terms, it is determined by the 
size of the domestic market, since the existence of a large 
domestic market reduces the need for international trade. 
Secondly – also in negative terms – it is determined by 
a country’s size, measured by the population logarithm, 
which affects the measurement of openness. Finally, 
in positive terms, it is determined by the size of the 
proximate international market, which facilitates trade 
and improves the potential for international insertion.
The quality of institutions is determined by several 
factors. First of all, in a negative sense, it is determined 
by the level of fractionalization of a society, which 
reinforces the tendency of agents to resort to informal 
institutions, diminishing the effectiveness (and sometimes 
the credibility) of the formal institutional system. Social 
fractionalization can be expressed through two alternative 
variables, both of which produce similar results: linguistic 
fractionalization and ethnic fractionalization (both are 
discussed by Alesina, Devleeshauwer and others, 2003). 
Both variables express the probability of having two 
randomly selected individuals from the same country 
speaking different languages or having different ethnic 
origins. Secondly, institutional quality can also be 
influenced by a country’s location, measured as its 
The above approaches could be transposed, even if only 
tentatively, to an empirical model that could be used to 
begin a discussion of the arguments outlined above. In 
simple terms, three basic options have been suggested to 
explain the development levels of countries: (i) Gallup, 
Sachs and Mellinger (1998) and Sachs (2001) stress the 
importance of geography (particularly access to the sea 
and distance from the tropics); (ii) Acemoglu, Johnson 
and Robinson (2002) emphasize the importance of 
institutions, shaped by a country’s colonization model; 
and (iii) Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2002) mention 
the potentially positive impact of trade, measured by 
the degree of trade liberalization. Nevertheless, despite 
their references to the instrumental variable developed 
by Frankel and Romer (1999), they did not find trade 
liberalization to be significant (and it figured with a 
negative sign). 
Like Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2002), this 
article assumes that a country’s level of development may 
be influenced by geography (measured in terms of distance 
from the tropics), institutional quality (measured by the 
rule-of-law indicator developed by Kaufmann, Kraay and 
Mastruzzi) and trade integration (measured by the degree 
of trade liberalization). The problem, however, is that 
the latter two variables (institutional quality and trade 
integration) are endogenous, as they may be influenced 
by a country’s level of development. Suitable estimation 
tools must therefore be developed.
In this regard, and bearing in mind previous studies, 
emphasis will be placed on the role played by the size 
and accessibility of both the domestic and the proximate 
international markets. Market size determines the level 
of productive specialization and, sometimes, the use of 
the economies of scale involved in the industrialization 
process; while accessibility, measured by the inverse of 
distance, provides an estimate of the costs of trade. In 
order to convert this factor into a suitable estimation 
tool, the relative market size is calculated according 
to the populations of urban nuclei, since a country’s 
commercial activities are concentrated in its cities. 
Population figures for 1890 are used, since that was 
when the arc of international income distribution began 
its course. In other words, as with gravitation models, the
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distance from the tropics. Environmental circumstances 
in the tropics adversely affect people’s health and 
soil productivity, hindering social networking and 
institutional quality. Thirdly, population size may 
have a negative effect on the quality of institutions 
since, all other things being equal, it is easier to 
develop effective and credible institutions in smaller 
countries. Finally, the size of the domestic market 
may have a positive effect on institutional quality, 
since it is related, to some extent, to a country’s level 
of urbanization.
The results of the estimation, which was performed 
using the ordinary least squares method in two stages 
(instrumental variables), suggest that development levels 
TABLE 1
Factors determining development a
Logarithm of per capita GDP to purchasing power parity, 2004
Nº of  observations: 125 Two stages (instrumental variables)










Trade (trade liberalization) –0.197
(–1.035)








First stage for endogenous variables
Rule of law Rule of law Trade  liberalization   
















Size of regional market 0.085
(2.630)












Source: Prepared by the author.
a The variable for level of development is the per capita GDP for 2004 at purchasing power parity (World Bank); the variable for institutional 
quality (rule of law) is the rule-of-law indicator included in the governance indicators listed by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2005); 
trade integration is expressed by the coefficient of liberalization (exports plus imports over GDP); the geographic variable is measured in 
absolute terms as latitude divided by 90; ethnic and linguistic fractionalization are taken from Alesina, Devleeschauwer and others (2003). 
Population figures are for 2004 (World Bank); size of domestic markets is based on all cities in a country that possessed 30,000 inhabitants 
in 1890, and distance from the capital is based on the following formula: 
Ln p p di i
i
n
* ,( ) 
=
∑ /
1 , where pc is the population of the capital in 1890, pi is the population of cities with more than 30,000 inhabitants in 1900, and d is the distance between the capital and each city; size of regional markets is estimated by applying the same formula to the population 
of the capitals of all countries located within a 3,000 km radius and the distance between them.
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can be explained, basically, by the institutional variable 
(table 1), thus supporting both Rodrik, Subramanian 
and Trebbi (2002) and the suggestions of AJR and ES. 
As noted in that study, the trade integration variable is 
not significant, and has a negative sign. The geographic 
variable operates with the right sign, and is almost 
significant. Nevertheless, geographic conditions also 
have a considerable impact on the quality of institutions, 
as was assumed in the model. Attention should also be 
paid to the explanatory capacity of variables constructed 
to measure the attraction potential of domestic and 
regional markets, which affect both economic openness 
and institutional quality. 
The estimation results show that geography and 
institutions influence a country’s development potential. 
However, the quality of institutions is not necessarily 
determined by a country’s colonization model, but rather 
by the social fractionalization underlying its institutions. 
Where social fractionalization is high, institutions are 
of poorer quality, largely because there may still be a 
fractionalized network of informal institutions. At the 
same time, the existence of a network of proximate urban 
nuclei on which to establish a market determines both 
a country’s potential for international insertion and the 
quality of its institutions. The latter is also influenced by 
the network of cities a country possesses; in addition to 
determining the size of the local market, such networks 
provide a basic idea of the level of urbanization. As for 
international insertion, what matters the most is that the 
country be located within a large and accessible regional 
environment. 
Beyond the hypotheses supported by this empirical 
exercise, there is still the question of how individual 
countries have used the opportunities provided by each 
of the factors explained above. Why, for example, did 
Australia overcome the limited availability of regional 
markets, while Morocco failed to take advantage of 
that relative advantage? Or why did Canada overcome 
its relatively high linguistic fractionalization, while 
Madagascar failed to benefit from its greater homogeneity? 
These are questions that challenge the findings of 
historical research, and call for a study of the specific 
issues involved in each case.
1. Inequality and institutions
In the preceding pages, an effort has been made to explain 
some of the limitations of the institutional hypothesis, 
as presented by its most qualified proponents. Its 
main limitation is its fruitless attempt to find a single, 
universal cause for underdevelopment. No development 
strategy can be applied everywhere, nor is there a 
single diagnosis of the factors that cause economic 
backwardness. This is true even for specific regions. 
In the case of Latin America, for example, economic 
backwardness was probably caused by a variety of 
different factors, including geographic conditions 
(problems with transportation and communication 
between and within countries), historical chance 
(postponing industrialization even as the transportation 
revolution was under way), institutional responses 
(particularly the dislocation of formal and informal 
institutions) and economic policy choices (Haber, 
2000). To these factors must be added the impact over 
time of the momentum that seems to be associated 
with rising productivity. It is hard to imagine that all 
of these factors could be reduced to a single cause. 
The shortcomings found in the works of AJR and 
ES should not lead the reader to reject some of their 
hypotheses, which are highly suggestive. In other 
words, the baby should not be thrown out with the 
bath water. 
Specifically, it seems plausible that inequality 
(in a broad sense, not just in terms of income) may 
determine the quality of collective action, and thus 
affect the efficiency and credibility of institutions; it 
is also reasonable to assume that these two issues – 
efficiency and credibility – influence economic results, 
as well as the willingness of a country to embark upon 
social change. Thus, there is no need to accept all the 
arguments made by ES to assume that “greater equality 
or homogeneity among the population led, over time, to 
more democratic political institutions, more investment 
in public goods and infrastructures, and to institutions 
that offered relatively broad access to property rights 
and economic opportunities.” (Engerman and Sokoloff, 
VI
Inequality, institutions and the bath water
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2006, p. 41). Nevertheless, it is important to (i) study in 
greater depth how the suggested relationship between 
inequality, institutions and growth operates; and (ii) 
consider the process of institutional change from a 
broader and more complex historical perspective.
The second issue is beyond the scope of this article. 
Nonetheless, it is important to note that no broad and 
convincing theory of institutional change has yet been 
developed (Lin and Nugent, 1995). The idea that the 
process of change follows a self-selective dynamic (as 
suggested by evolutionists), and that the most efficient 
institutions survive spontaneously, does not appear to 
be grounded in reality; neither does the assumption that 
institutional change arises solely from conflicts between 
competing interests, or from the pursuit of income on 
the part of individual or group agents in the complex 
political market (as suggested by the public choice 
school). The process of institutional change appears 
to be much more complex, involving not only material 
factors but also the cultural factors (worldviews) that 
are prevalent in a given society (Chang and Evans, 
2000). That is why it is difficult to transplant existing 
institutional models or generate institutional realities 
ex novo in a given country. Historians may therefore 
play a key role in furthering the understanding of 
institutional change.
Further progress is possible, however, in the analysis 
of the relationship between inequality and institutional 
quality. In principle, an institution may be defined as 
an intertemporal contract, the effectiveness of which 
depends on two factors: (i) its social efficiency and (ii) 
its credibility. Efficiency is understood as the capacity 
of an institutional framework to reduce transaction 
costs and generate behaviour that is compatible with 
efficiency incentives – i.e., that allows for equilibrium 
in the interplay of institutions, in such a way that, from 
a dynamic perspective, everyone can benefit (or, at 
least, winners can compensate losers). Credibility is 
understood as the capacity of the institutional framework 
to influence the behaviour of agents – that is, to define 
valid intertemporal contracts. Both criteria are necessary, 
inasmuch as there is no point in having a supposedly 
efficient institution if it does not shape social conduct. 
At the same time, there is no guarantee that having 
legitimate institutions will necessarily lead to socially 
optimal responses.
The relationship between inequality and collective 
action may be considered in the light of three arguments 
that are not necessarily incompatible.
(a) Inequality and collective action
One of the basic reasons for building institutions is to 
provide public goods (of different types) for society. Many 
of these public goods require cooperative contributions 
from different agents. The theory of collective action 
suggests two hypotheses that link, in a negative sense, 
the levels of provision of a public good with the levels 
of equality of the group concerned. Firstly, in the case 
of impure public goods, Olson (1965) argues that large 
contributors are “exploited” by small ones:  the former 
tend to assume the costs of provision, even when small 
contributors do not cooperate, because they receive 
greater net benefits from the public good. Secondly, in 
the case of pure public goods (in the absence of corner 
solutions), Cornes and Sandler (1996) have shown that the 
principle of neutrality prevails:  provision is independent 
from the distribution of effort among contributors. In 
both cases, modelling occurs under highly restrictive 
assumptions, using a static two-player model. 
A somewhat more complex proposition might be 
suggested: Baland and Platteau (2007) and Bardhan 
(2005) explore the consequences of inequality in a game 
that is extended over time. Bardhan and Singh (2004) 
discuss the possibilities of a multi-player model that 
allows for the formation of coalitions. The results of 
these proposals differ from those mentioned above, and 
suggest the existence of a direct relationship between 
equality and efficiency in providing public goods.
Bardhan (2005), in particular, discusses the existence 
of inequality in a non-transferable good (private capital, 
for example), and accepts increases in efficiency brought 
about by technological advances in the production of 
inputs that are complementary to capital. Although 
incentives for cooperation are greater among the wealthier 
members of the community (all else being equal), the 
result may vary according to the coalition structures 
resulting from existing levels of inequality. Among their 
main findings, Bardhan and Singh (2004) point out that 
a reduction of inequality can increase the willingness 
to cooperate of those whose relative position improves 
(box 1). In other words, under conditions more similar 
to social dynamics, reducing inequality improves the 
willingness of agents to cooperate. This position has been 
the subject of empirical studies by Bardhan and Dayton-
Johnson (2007) in water management communities in 
Mexico and south India, and by Cárdenas (2007) in the 
case of Colombia.
(b) Inequality and institutional instability
The previous section dealt with the correlation 
between inequality and incentives for cooperative action. 
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Box 1
Simple model of the impact of increased inequality 
on the provision of public goods
A decentralized assignment model is posited in which each player plays independently. Total production of a collective 
good is ∑= ixX . Each individual action is added through the following linear function: z bx cXi i= + . . In the case of positive externalities and pure public goods, c>0 and b=0; if the public good is impure, c>0 and b>0. In the case of 
negative externalities and a common good, c< 0 and b>0; in the case of a private good, c=0 and b>0.
In a Nash equilibrium, each player chooses an optimum action given the action chosen by the others. In other words, 
each player resolves as follows:
                                                    
With the function g(wi)>0 as the value of zi that resolves the first-order conditions of the previous function, stated as 
an equality
                                                      
g(w) represents the level of the collective input z that i would choose given his wealth w. Individual players can only 
affect the collective good through their respective contributions. If x  is the optimum choice of a player, as









                                             





∑ ( ) can be derived from the previous equation, 
where  m is the number of agents in the equilibrium. Thus, X is the sum of m concave functions and, consequently, X itself 
is concave. In this case, the contribution is maximized when all the agents have the same amount of the private input.
This is now applied to the case of two agents, where the wealth of one (1) is w+ε and that of the other (2) is w-ε, with 
ε>0. Let us consider the response functions of each player
                                                            
In order to see a change in distribution, let us assume that distribution increases from ε to ε´, which would increase x1 
and reduce x2. In the case of positive externalities, the results are shown in the figure. The displacement of R2 is greater 
than that of R1.
Given the concavity assumption, the difference between g(w-ε) and g(w-ε′) is greater than the difference between g(w+ε) 
and g(w+ε´). The new point of equilibrium (B) is below and to the left of the isocontribution straight line. In other words, 
as inequality increases, there is an aggregate loss (the reduction of the contribution by 2 is greater than the increase in 







Source: Based on Bardhan, Ghatak and Karaivanov (2007).
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The same problem could be viewed from a political 
perspective. In principle, there are three basic mechanisms 
whereby an institution becomes self-replicating: tradition 
(one does what has always been done); coercion (one 
must do something to avoid a penalty); and shared 
willingness (one does what has been agreed because it is 
a reasonable solution to a coordination problem). While 
all these mechanisms may be effective, the last one is 
the least likely to elicit criticism, and the most likely to 
ensure the stability of the institutional framework.
Nevertheless, in order for this shared willingness 
to be possible, the institutional equilibrium must meet 
the expectations of the agents involved. They will 
not readily support an institutional framework that 
systematically produces a highly unequal distribution 
of the benefits arising from collective action (Easterly, 
Ritzan and Woolcock, 2005). In such cases, the 
institutional equilibrium will be called into question, 
and attempts will be made to alter the rules of the game. 
This explains why there is a close association between 
marked inequality and institutional instability (Alesina 
and Perotti, 1996).
This proposition can be stated in more formal 
terms if institutions are understood in terms of a game 
extended over time – that is, a game based on repeated 
interaction between agents. The distribution of benefits 
arising from collective action is crucial to ensuring 
that the players are inclined to cooperate, even if the 
static structure of the game is that of the prisoner’s 
dilemma (box 2 and Alonso, 2006). This suggests that 
the credibility of institutions depends, to a large extent, 
on their ability to generate inclusive responses.
Box 2
Possibilities for cooperation in dynamic games
From a dynamic perspective, the conclusions arising from the prisoner’s dilemma may be substantially altered by 
increasing opportunities for cooperation and efficiency. To illustrate this point, the structure of the prisoner’s dilemma 
can be applied to a case in which successive moves are allowed. Each agent has three possible strategies: the two already 
known – defection and cooperation – and a third – reciprocity – in which the response of one player is met in the same 
fashion by the other player. Since decisions have consequences over time, the existence of a discount rate must be 
considered, such that the present value of a given net benefit b will extend over an infinite number of years: b/(1-r). Let 
us assume the supply of public goods costs is 10, and the benefits obtained from those goods are eight for each agent. 
The following scenarios are possible:
If both players choose reciprocity on the bases of cooperation, in the first round each player will obtain 6/(1-r) (box 1). 
The result is the same when one player decides to cooperate and the other acts reciprocally, or when both cooperate (boxes 
2, 4 and 5). On the other hand, when one player chooses reciprocity and the other chooses defection, the first player will 
obtain a result of -2 in the first round and zero in the rest, while the second player will obtain 8 and 0, respectively (boxes 
3 and 7). When one player systematically decides to cooperate and the other to defect, the first player will obtain -2/(1-r) 
and the second will obtain 8/(1-r) (boxes 6 and 8). Finally, if both decide not to cooperate in all rounds, they will both 
obtain 0 (box 9).
The two players do not have a predominant strategy, but rather two Nash equilibria. One is the usual result of the prisoner’s dilemma 
(box 9), but the other one is an efficient solution (box 1). In other words, the simple act of introducing a dynamic perspective 
and allowing for the existence of a strategy of reciprocity is enough to create the possibility of an efficient response
Prisoner’s dilemma with infinite games
 Reciprocity Cooperation Defection
Reciprocity  (1)  (2)  (3)
6/(1-r); 6/(1-r) 6/(1-r); 6/(1-r) –2,0; 8,0
Cooperation  (4)  (5)  (6)
 6/(1-r); 6/(1-r)) 6/(1-r); 6/(1-r) –2/(1-r); 8/(1-r)
Defection  (7)  (8)  (9)
–2,0; 8,0 –2/(1-r); 8/(1-r) 0; 0
Source: Prepared by the author.
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c) Inequality and informal institutions
Finally, social inequality can drive certain segments 
of society to resort to informal institutions as defence 
mechanisms and for collective protection. These 
institutions are not always dysfunctional, but they are 
usually less coordinated with the market and more 
resistant to change, as noted above. Hence, this option 
seems to hamper the development and efficacy of formal 
institutions, as well as the flexibility and willingness to 
change of the existing institutional framework. In this case, 
inequality operates through its impact on the development 
of informality. This is not a forced assumption, given that 
the available data (still of poor quality) reveal a direct 
correlation between levels of inequality of countries and 
the relative weight of their informal sectors (as shown 
by Perry, Maloney and others, 2007).
2. Inequality and social mobility
Although inequality has been mentioned without going 
into detail, the arguments set forth – particularly in the 
last two cases – become more relevant when discussing 
horizontal inequality – that is, inequality between 
groups of people– in an environment of limited social 
mobility. Willingness to cooperate is more seriously 
jeopardized when inequality generates mechanisms of 
solidarity between affected groups. This is the case when 
horizontal inequality is high and social mobility is low. 
Likewise, the tendency to resort to informal institutions 
increases when social fractionalization is high, which 
occurs in situations of horizontal inequality and low 
social mobility. 
Social mobility plays a significant role in this regard. 
To put it the other way around, even in a context of 
inequality, social mobility helps mitigate the tendency to 
question the existing institutional framework: the success 
of some underprivileged individuals encourages the rest 
(this is the “tunnel effect” suggested by Hirschman, 
1981). The absence of personal success is viewed as 
a consequence of one’s own inability (others have 
succeeded), rather than as a limitation of the existing 
institutional order. The absence of social mobility in an 
environment of marked inequality feeds the tendency to 
question the existing institutional framework, increasing 
the level of instability and conflict within a society.
The analyses above are relevant when judging the 
case of Latin America, given that the region is characterized 
not only by a high level of vertical inequality, as shown by 
the Gini inequality index, but also by marked horizontal 
inequality and very low social mobility (although 
this characteristic is not universal, and has been less 
researched than others). Horizontal inequality is revealed 
by an analysis of vectors of poverty, which define the 
asymmetrical probabilities of being poor as a function 
of the population’s living in a rural or urban area or of 
its ethnic origin (indigenous, mestizo or white). Limited 
social mobility is reflected by the fact that the poverty 
of one generation (parents) is highly predictive of the 
poverty of the next (children). Thus, it is not surprising 
that institutional quality is a serious problem in Latin 
America. Overcoming it will entail not only improving 
the technical aspects of the institutional response, but 
also taking action on the social legitimacy of institutions 
themselves, which is closely tied to the distribution 
patterns with which they are associated.
VII
Final remarks 
The arguments set forth above lead to certain conclusions 
that may be helpful when considering a development 
agenda for Latin America. In short:
1. The region is characterized by marked social 
inequality. It is debatable, however, whether this 
feature can be traced back five hundred years to the 
colonial period. Historical studies seem to suggest 
that inequality (along with economic backwardness) 
is a much more recent phenomenon that arose in 
the late nineteenth century. Factors such as Latin 
America’s postcolonial model of international 
insertion (based on the exploitation of natural 
resources), the massive influx of immigrants that 
preceded the First World War and the existence of 
institutions that were ill-suited to social change 
may have contributed to such a result.
2. This is not to say that institutions do not play a 
significant role in determining the dynamics of 
a country’s long-term growth. In fact, empirical 
analysis seems to support the proposition that 
institutional quality is important in the long run. 
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Nevertheless, this factor must be considered along 
with others, such as market access.
3. Not enough is known, however, about the keys to 
institutional change, and there are well-founded 
doubts regarding whether an optimal institutional 
framework is even possible. On the contrary, there 
are probably sub-optimal solutions that can be 
effective under the specific conditions of a given 
economy. Consequently, local conditions must be 
taken into account when assessing the quality of 
institutions. 
4. The institutional framework is made up of formal 
and informal institutions. Nevertheless, given 
their greater transparency, formal institutions are 
better suited to change, and allow for greater social 
mobility. In traditional or highly fractionalized 
societies, underprivileged sectors tend to resort to 
informal institutions. Such informality can hinder 
social change.
5. The quality of institutions depends on their efficiency 
and their credibility. Both factors can be affected 
by the existing levels of inequality: efficiency, 
because the strategic game can lead to results that 
are not compatible with the framework of incentives; 
credibility, because the unequal distribution of the 
fruits of collective action can limit the willingness 
to cooperate of the social agents that have been 
harmed.
6. A closer look at the correlations mentioned above 
shows that inequality can influence the quality 
of institutions in at least three different ways: (i) 
it may limit the provision of public goods; (ii) it 
weakens confidence in the intertemporal contracts 
that institutions promote; and (iii) it encourages 
recourse to informal institutions. All of these factors 
can affect an economy’s potential for growth.
7. Finally, vertical inequality is not the only relevant 
issue; horizontal inequality and the lack of social 
mobility are also extremely important. These last 
two factors are key to understanding the relationship 
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